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The English scheme of arrangement process has, in many ways, proved a reliable friend to
distressed companies and their majority finance creditors in the decade following the financial
crisis. However, experience of using the scheme process to achieve a debt restructuring has
highlighted a number of areas where it could be improved for the present, or to make it more
adaptable in the future. This article was written at a time when the Insolvency Service had
launched a review of the corporate insolvency framework in the UK (and published many of
the responses which it has received to the consultation), and the European Commission had
published a proposal for a new Directive setting minimum harmonisation standards for
restructuring law. Both the consultation and the proposal have significant implications for the
reform agenda, and the Government has published its response to the UK consultation just as
this article is going to press. This paper focuses on the introduction of a preliminary morator-
ium as a gateway to restructuring efforts, the crucial question of how to value the enterprise if
a cram down mechanism is introduced and the role of the insolvency practitioner in the
scheme context.
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Introduction
Much of my recent work has focused on the way in which the English law
scheme of arrangement procedure can be used to break deadlocked negotia-
tions when a majority of the financial creditors wish to restructure the debts of
a large, financially distressed company, but a minority are not willing to accept
the debt restructuring plan. This has been a particular issue around the globe
after the financial crisis, not least because financial innovation in the last couple
of decades has resulted in a good deal more complexity in capital structures
and in a more diverse group of creditors (who must be co-ordinated) on the
one hand, and a much better understanding of the benefits of deleveraging a
distressed balance sheet in anticipation of better times ahead on the other. The
English scheme of arrangement process has, in many ways, proved a reliable
friend to distressed companies and their majority finance creditors in the crisis.
However, experience of using the scheme process to achieve a debt restructur-
ing during the crisis has highlighted a number of areas where it could be
improved for the present, or to make it more adaptable in the future. In my
work I have analysed (in greater and lesser levels of detail) why the scheme
process has worked tolerably well without a moratorium, but reasons why we
may nonetheless wish to provide for a moratorium going forwards,1 why we
may wish to provide for cram down between classes of creditors within a
scheme and how we should approach questions of fairness in allocating pro-
ceeds of the debt restructuring,2 and whether there should be a role for the
insolvency practitioner in the scheme of arrangement procedure.3 This article
was written at a time when the Insolvency Service had launched a review of the
corporate insolvency framework in the UK (and had published many of the
responses which it has received to the consultation),4 and the European Com-
mission had published a proposal for a newDirective setting minimum harmo-
nisation standards for restructuring law.5 The Government has published its
1 S. Paterson, ‘Rethinking the Role of Corporate Bankruptcy Theory in the Twenty-first
Century’ (2016) 36(4) OJLS 697.
2 S.Paterson, ‘Debt Restructuring and Notions of Fairness’ (2017) 80(4) MLR 600.
3 S.Paterson, ‘Bargaining in Financial Restructuring: Market Norms, Legal Rights and
Regulatory Standards’ (2014) 14(2) JCLS 333.
4 Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/a-review-of-the-corporate-
insolvency-framework.
5 European Commission Proposal for a Directive on Preventative Restructuring Frame-
works, Second Chance and Measures to Increase the Efficiency of Restructuring,
Insolvency and Discharge Procedures (henceforth the “European Commission propo-
sal”).
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response to the review just as this article is going to press.6 Both the response
to the consultation and the proposal go beyond reform of schemes of arrange-
ment, but both have significant implications for them. The purpose of this
paper is to set some of my previous work firmly in the context of my response
to the consultation and my reaction to the proposal, and to consider further
some of the points which I noted in previous work but left for another day
which are relevant to that enquiry.
The Scheme of Arrangement Procedure
English insolvency law has no single gateway through which a distressed
company must pass before its debts are restructured, its business and assets
sold as a going concern or its assets sold on a break-up basis. Instead, this
choice is largely left to the directors and (in some circumstances) the creditors.
There are currently 7 relevant procedures:
– Scheme of arrangement
– Company voluntary arrangement (CVA)
– Administration
– Fixed charge receivership
– Where a relevant exception applies in the Enterprise Act 2002, adminis-
trative receivership
– Creditors’ voluntary liquidation
– Compulsory liquidation
Schemes of Arrangement are found in the Companies Act 2006.7 Indeed, the
fact that they exist outside insolvency legislation is thought to be one of their
great strengths, given that the value destructive nature of insolvency proceed-
ings is better understood in modern markets. Thus, even in the US where there
has been a long tradition of using legal procedure to restructure corporate
debts, fewer chapter 11 cases begin without any kind of negotiated plan than
would have been the case in the 1980s and 1990s, and pre-negotiated restruc-
6 Insolvency and Corporate Governance Government Response 26 August 2018 (hence-
forth the “Government Response”).
7 Part 26 sections 895–901.
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turings, pre-packaged plans and pre-arranged sales of assets now dominate
chapter 11 practice.8
An English scheme of arrangement may be proposed to achieve a ‘compro-
mise or arrangement’ between a company and its creditors. Compromise
presupposes some sort of dispute,9 but ‘arrangement’ is interpreted broadly
and does not require something analogous to a compromise.10 Ultimately, all
that is needed is some element of ‘give and take’ so that a creditor is not being
asked simply to give something up and get nothing in return.11 Thus schemes
have been used to implement not only debt restructurings with which this
paper is primarily concerned (such as debt-for-equity and debt-for-debt
swaps) but also to amend existing debt arrangements to loosen covenants,
extend maturities or even to implement a moratorium whilst a restructuring
is agreed.
There will ordinarily be a pre-procedural phase in which the debt restructur-
ing is negotiated. The specific issue which the scheme process is designed to
address in a financial restructuring is the unanimous or very high consent
thresholds ordinarily mandated in the loan agreement or bond documenta-
tion for many of the actions which are required to implement the debt
restructuring plan. By contrast, the scheme of arrangement requires a vote of
75% by value and a majority in number of the members of each scheme class.
Sometimes the scheme will merely be ‘threatened’ so that creditors will
decide they may as well agree out-of-court (and sometimes worse terms are
threatened if it proves necessary to proceed by way of a scheme). But in
other cases, once the debt restructuring has been agreed by a sufficient
majority to enable it to be implemented via a scheme of arrangement if there
is still a hold-out minority the scheme process is commenced. The classic
formulation for a scheme class is that it must be ‘confined to those persons
whose rights are not so dissimilar to make it impossible for them to consult
together with a view to their common interest.’12 However, as creditors vote
in class and the requisite majorities must be achieved in each of them, the
courts are mindful of the need to avoid a proliferation of classes. In particu-
lar, they have emphasised the need to focus on rights (both rights which are
to be released or varied under the scheme and the new rights to be granted
under it) rather than interests. Thus questions of whether some creditors are
8 See, for example, D. Baird and R. Rasmussen, ‘Chapter 11 at Twilight’ (2003) 56 Stan.
L. Rev. 673, 674–675.
9 Sneath v Valley Gold Ltd [1893] 1 Ch 477.
10 Re Guardian Assurance Co Ltd [1917] 1 Ch 431.
11 Re NFU Development Trust Ltd [1972] 1 WLR 1548; Re Uniq plc [2011] EWCH 749
(Ch).
12 Sovereign Life Assurance Co v Dodd [1892] 2 QB 573.
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influenced in voting by the fact that they have entered into a lock-up agree-
ment to support the scheme,13 or that they have received a modest consent
fee,14 have tended to go to the question of interests (which is relevant later in
the process) and not rights (which is relevant in the early stages).
The first procedural step is to send out a letter setting out the scheme timetable
and the classification of classes for voting on the scheme. The scheme then
proceeds in a number of clearly defined stages. First, a ‘permission to convene’
hearing is held at which creditors may appear to argue that the composition of
the classes is unfair,15 or to raise issues with the manner in which the class
meetings are proposed to be held, but ‘emphatically not ... to consider the
merits and fairness of the scheme’.16 The scheme document is circulated,
together with an explanatory statement. The scheme meetings are then held, at
which the requisite majorities must be achieved in each class. Assuming that
the majorities are achieved, a further court hearing is held, at which the court
must be satisfied that the ‘arrangement is such as an intelligent and honest man
acting in respect of his own interest might reasonably approve’,17 before
sanctioning it. The court will ordinarily be of the view that ‘if the creditors are
acting on sufficient information and with time to consider what they are about,
and have acted honestly, they are ... much better judges of what is to their
commercial advantage than the Court can be.’18 But the court will be alive to
claims that a creditor who has been left out of the scheme should have been
included within it,19 or that a creditor who has been included in the scheme has
been treated too favourably, or that creditors have been ‘unfairly coerced by a
majority within their class in terms of having been corralled by people whose
rights appear similar but whose objects and interests were poles apart.’20 Even
if no-one appears at the sanction hearing to challenge the scheme, the court
will consider it carefully before sanctioning it. Once the scheme has been
sanctioned, and the court order filed at Companies House, it is very difficult to
challenge the scheme, other than in the case of a fraud which affected the
result.21
13 Telewest Communications plc [2004] BCC 356; McCarthy & Stone plc, McCarthy and
Stone (Developments) Limited [2009] EWHC 712 (Ch);Metrovacesa SA [2011] EWHC
1014 (Ch).
14 Re DX Holdings Ltd [2010] EWHC 1513 (Ch); Seat Pagine Gialle Spa [2012] EWHC
686.
15 Re SovereignMarine [2007] 1 BCLC 238.
16 Re Telewest Communications plc (No 1) [2004] BCC 342.
17 Re National Bank Limited [1966] 1 AER 1006.
18 Re English, Scottish and Austrialian Chartered Bank [1893] 3 Ch 385, at 409.
19 MyTravel [2004] EWCACiv 1734;Re Bluebrook Ltd [2009] EWHC 2114 (Ch).
20 PrimacomHolding GmbH [2011] EWHC 3746 (Ch), at para 49..
21 Fletcher v RAC (1999) 96(II) L.S.G. 69.
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Thus, although the scheme is relatively procedurally heavy for a small or
medium sized enterprise, it is relatively ‘light touch’ for a large company with
a complex capital structure when compared with other debt restructuring
procedures around the world. It has proved adaptable (in terms of scope) and
predictable (in terms of outcome) in the crisis, and has influenced discussion
around reform of chapter 11 in the US, and around corporate restructuring
reform in Europe. However, its great strength has proved to be in cases which
are what we might call ‘largely consensual’; cases where the majority of
financial creditors coalesce around a debt restructuring plan and where it has
been possible to reach an accommodation with the equity, so that only a
relatively small number of (sometimes unidentified) hold-out creditors re-
main.
Although English lawyers have developed a method of ‘twinning’ the scheme
of arrangement with a pre-packaged administration where an entire class does
not agree to the restructuring plan, as we shall see this is a much less elegant
solution and has not been extensively tested. Some of the (unanticipated)
developments in the finance market in the wake of government policy after the
crisis have been the development of increasingly complex capital structures
refinancing many leveraged situations,22 the return of collateralised loan ob-
ligations,23 the growth in high yield bond issues and the development of what
is known as the ‘Term Loan B Market’ in which lenders trade financial cove-
nant protection for (small) improvements in yield.24 There is a concern that
some or all of these innovations may mean that restructuring situations in the
next slow-down in the finance cycle will not be amenable to the quasi-con-
sensual approach which has dominated post 2008. In other words, the concern
arises that we do not have a debt restructuring procedure equal to a more
contentious fight. In particular, concerns have been voiced about the absence
of a moratorium, and the requirement that majorities be achieved in each class
before the scheme can be implemented.
Secondly, the crisis has, for the most part, been a finance crisis for large
business. Unusual monetary policy conditions have meant that interest rates
have stayed staggeringly low, and for the most part trading conditions recov-
ered relatively rapidly after the worst of the crisis (although growth remains
sluggish). This has meant that, in the large company space, financial liabilities
22 S. Paterson, ‘The Adaptive Capacity of Markets and Convergence in Law: UK High
Yield Issuers, US Investors and Insolvency Law’ (2015) 78(3) MLR 431.
23 S&P Global RatingsDirect Leveraged Finance: Borrower-friendly Credit Conditions
Endure as the European Leveraged Finance Market Shrugs Off Brexit Uncertainty
8 August, 2016, p.5.
24 White & Case A Brave New World for International Leveraged Debt (Debtwire Xtract
Research 2016).
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have typically been sufficient to absorb losses, so that almost all debt restruc-
turing cases have involved only financial creditors and the scheme of arrange-
ment (and the jurisprudence which has developed through the crisis) has
proved equal to this task. There are concerns, however, about how well-
adapted the scheme of arrangement would be to deal with a large company
debt restructuring which implicated trade creditors as well as financial cred-
itors.
Finally, there has not been a significant incentive to prefer sale in the market
(causing losses to trade creditors) over a debt restructuring which leaves trade
creditors untroubled, given the absence of many traditional bidders in the
market. We cannot rule out that third party sale (and trade creditor loss) may
return as a more viable alternative in the future. None of these points is
developed expressly in the Insolvency Service consultation or the Government
response, but it is suggested that they have influenced the concerns in the
market which are reflected within it and the development of the European
Commission proposal. This paper will now turn to the first issue: the absence
of a moratorium.
Moratorium
In my earlier work, I have unpicked why schemes of arrangement have
operated pretty well during the financial crisis notwithstanding that they do
not offer a statutory moratorium and notwithstanding the fact that bankruptcy
theory tells us that a moratorium is essential to prevent creditors from taking
individual enforcement action to ‘grab’ assets before the restructuring can be
implemented.25 In that work I drew a (controversial) line between restructur-
ing situations, in which the market sees potential in restructuring the business,
and an insolvency situation in which finance creditors are no longer willing to
support the business.26 The details of that distinction need not detain us here,
but the relevance for this account is the analysis of the moratorium and the
scheme of arrangement. I sought to show how an active distressed debt trading
market in large company situations provided an alternative route for lenders
25 TH Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements and the Creditors’ Bargain’
(1982) 91(5) Yale LJ 857; TH Jackson, ‘Translating Assets and Liabilities to the Bank-
ruptcy Forum’ (1985) 14(1) JLS 73; TH Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy
Law (Harvard University Press 1986); TH Jackson, RE Scott, T Eisenburg and M Roe,
‘On the Nature of Bankruptcy: An Essay in Bankruptcy Sharing and the Creditors’
Bargain’ (1989) 75(2) Va L Rev 155.
26 S. Paterson, ‘Rethinking the Role of Corporate Bankruptcy Theory in the Twenty-first
Century’ (2016) 36(4) OJLS 697.
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who do not wish to support the situation, so that those who are not willing to
support a restructuring trade out, and those who are willing to support a
restructuring trade in. I examined the incentives of financial creditors (other
than distressed debt traders) who did not choose to sell, and did not find a
significant incentive to prefer enforcement.27 And I highlighted the role which
modern financing documentation plays in providing contractual moratorium
protection against enforcement. Overall, I concluded that we could explain
why the scheme of arrangement has managed quite well without a statutory
moratorium. We might also add to this the willingness of the English courts, in
appropriate cases, to exercise their case management powers to create morator-
ium protection when a scheme of arrangement is well-advanced, commands
wide support and appears to be in the interests of creditors;28 the ability of
debtors to commit lenders sufficient to block enforcement action to a stay in
the lock-up agreements signed as part of the restructuring negotiations; and
the possibility of using the scheme of arrangement procedure itself to create an
interim moratorium.
However, I also raised several notes of caution. First, I highlighted just how
crucial an active distressed debt market is to the analysis. At present, there
appears to be an active and healthy distressed debt market in the UK, but we
cannot be assured that it will be there for ever. Things change rapidly in
modern financial markets. In the 1990s there was a deep and active market for
providing so called debtor-in-possession financing to companies in chapter 11.
However, a combination of reform to secured transaction law in the US,
changes to practice in chapter 11 and significant regulatory changes, have led
to the rapid decline of that market.29 In the same way, we cannot be assured
that the distressed debt market will be a permanent feature, or that it will
always function in the same way. Moreover, as mentioned above, there has
been a growth in access to the high yield bondmarket and so-called Term Loan
B financing. Neither of these typically provides detailed maintenance financial
covenants, so that it may be more challenging to bring the borrower to the
table to negotiate and there may not be a long runway in which creditors can
trade in and out before something must be done. Situations may become
inherently more hostile. This may necessitate stronger tactics, such as threaten-
ing to cease to make interest payments until a restructuring has been agreed.
Yet these tactics will also implicate difficult questions of directors’ duties unless
statutory endorsement of a payment moratorium is available. And finally the
crisis may take a different form, necessitating compromise of trade credit as
27 Ibid., 714–715.
28 Sea Assets Ltd v PT Garuda Indonesia; Bluecrest Mercantile NV v Vietnam Shipbuild-
ing Industry Group [2013] EWHC 1146 (Comm).
29 ABI Commission Report into Reform of chapter 11 at 75fn 296.
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well as financial liabilities, so that new incentives for another class of creditor
to grab assets are introduced.
For all of these reasons I am not averse to providing for a voluntary morator-
ium in the scheme of arrangement process. Both the Government response and
the European Commission proposal advance something rather different: a new
preliminary procedure which would act as a gateway to restructuring or
insolvency procedures. The preliminary moratorium idea clearly raises wider
questions outside the scope of this paper. But insofar as it relates to the scheme
of arrangement procedure a number of observations may be made.
First, difficult questions arise over timing. The original Insolvency Service
proposal was for a moratorium of three months, extendable with the consent of
all of the secured creditors and a majority of unsecured creditors, whilst the
European Commission proposal is for a moratorium of four months, extend-
able with the consent of judicial or administrative authority.30 Respondents to
the Insolvency Service consultation raised concerns both that 3 months is too
long (if it also stays the hand of trade creditors, for example) and too short (in
order to negotiate a complex debt restructuring), and raised concerns about the
extension mechanics. The Government response concludes that the new mor-
atorium should be for 28 days, extendable, in certain circumstances, for a further
28 days.Creditor consentwould be needed to extendbeyond this 56 dayperiod.
Perhaps more importantly from a macro-perspective, it was not clear in the
Insolvency Service consultation whether the new moratorium would be op-
tional or compulsory. I strongly suggested, inmy response, that themoratorium
should be optional. We are already aware, from experience of the company
voluntary arrangement procedure in the UK that distressed companies may be
wary about announcing moratorium protection because this will draw un-
wanted publicity to a delicate situation. A number of respondents also raised
this point, and theGovernment response confirms the optional approach.
Secondly, there are difficult questions on scope. The Insolvency Service pro-
posal was not entirely clear as to the scope of the moratorium, but the Govern-
ment response confirms that it will be broadly based on the moratorium which
is currently available in an English law administration. This imposes a mora-
torium on creditors’ rights to pursue a winding up, enforce security or repos-
sess goods under hire purchase, conditional sale, chattel leasing or retention of
title agreements, re-enter premises as landlord or pursue legal process against
the company (including legal proceedings, execution, distress or diligence).31
The European Commission proposal is more developed, and suggests that the
30 Article 6 of the European Commission proposal.
31 Insolvency Act 1986 Sch B1 para 43.
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stay of enforcement could be general (affecting all creditors) or targeted
towards individual creditors.32 This is a point I return to below.
At present the moratorium in administration does not generally prevent the
exercise of contractual termination rights,33 although certain utility and IT
suppliers can be required to supply provided the insolvency office holder is
willing to offer a personal guarantee.34 However, the company may have many
other suppliers who are not utility or IT suppliers but who are nonetheless
critical to the business. If this is the case, the administrator is able to pay the
supplier’s pre-administration debts as a ‘ransom’ creditor,35 but this gives rise
to two issues. The first is that payment alone may not induce the supplier to
continue to supply. The second is that it enables the supplier to exploit its
ransom position to gain preferential treatment compared with other, non-
ransom unsecured creditors.
The Insolvency Service consultation proposed a mechanism for expanding the
definition of suppliers who would have limited ability to terminate within the
moratorium where they provide ‘essential’ supplies, foreshadowing the sug-
gestion in the European Commission proposal that Member States should at
least prevent termination of essential supplies such as gas, electricity, water,
telecoms and card payment services but may choose to go further.36 Even
where a scheme of arrangement is only proposed amongst financial creditors,
the rights of counterparties to terminate contracts may still be relevant, because
contracts may contain termination rights which are triggered when a scheme is
proposed and so, in principle at least, this seems like a good idea In the US,
typically contractual provisions that permit a party to terminate or modify
what is known as an executory contract (essentially a contract which has not
been fully performed) by virtue of the counterparty’s insolvency or bank-
ruptcy filing are unenforceable.37 The debtor is then able to decide whether to
assume or reject the contract,38 and will often use the threat of rejecting the
32 European Commission proposal Recital (19) and Article 6.
33 ReOlympia & York CanaryWharf Ltd [1993] BCC 154.
34 Section 233 Insolvency Act 1986 and The Insolvency (Protection of Essential Supplies)
Order 2015.
35 The analysis is moderately complex but relies on the ability to terminate contracts in
administration (Re Olympia & York Canary Wharf Ltd [1993] BCC 154), Insolvency
Act 1986 Sch. B1 para. 66 which permits an administrator to make a payment other than
in accordance with the normal rules of distribution where ‘he thinks it is likely to assist
the achievement of the purpose of the administration’ and Insolvency Act 1986 Sch 1
para 13 which empowers the administrator to make ‘any payment which is necessary or
incidental to the performance of his functions’.
36 European Commission proposal Recital (21) and Article 7(4).
37 11 U.S.C § 365(e).
38 11 U.S.C § 365.
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contract to obtain (or attempt to obtain) concessions from suppliers and other
parties. Similarly, Canadian courts have drawn on their discretionary powers,
in making a stay order pursuant to the Canadian Companies’ Creditors
Arrangement Act (CCAA),39 to prevent a creditor from terminating an execu-
tory contract with the debtor. In Doman Industries Ltd Mr. Justice David
Tysoe of the British Columbia Supreme Court also found that the court has
similar jurisdiction to grant a permanent stay surviving restructuring of the
debtor company in respect of events of default or breaches occurring prior to
the restructuring.40 The Government has indicated, in its response to the
Insolvency Service proposals, that it no longer intends to require the designa-
tion of essential supplies by a debtor company. Instead, the Government plans
to legislate to prohibit the enforcement of termination clauses by most suppli-
ers in contracts for the supply of goods and services where the termination
clause is triggered by entry into a formal insolvency procedure, the pre-
insolvency moratorium already discussed or the restructuring plan procedure
discussed below. The proposal raises many questions and issues, but for our
purposes it also directly implicates classic concerns for fairness (for non-
consequentialists), economic concerns of negative ripple effects (for conse-
quentialists) and wider questions about the effect of such interventions on
entrepreneurialism.
In my previous work, I have challenged the idea of fairness as an intuitive
concept, adopting Amartya Sen’s challenge not to ‘give our unscrutinised
instincts an unconditional final say.’41 In particular, as we shall see later, I have
distinguished between fairness concerns where parties are of unequal bargain-
ing power and sophistication, and where parties are of equal bargaining power
and sophistication but have struck different bargains. As I say, this point will
be developed in due course. But for the moment the point is made that staying
the hand of small suppliers during attempts to rescue large businesses immedi-
ately gives rise to a fairness concern. Furthermore, many respondents to the
consultation pointed out the potential for negative ripple effects if suppliers
who were forced to supply struggled to secure their own supplies, or lost the
protection of credit insurance and were ultimately left unpaid. At the most
macro level, we may worry that this reluctance to protect the freedom of
contract of small suppliers may have an impact on entrepreneurialism gener-
39 Companies’Creditors Arrangement Act R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended.
40 Doman Industries Ltd, Re (2003), 2003 Carswell BC 538, [2003] BCJ No. 562 (B.C. S.
C. [In Chambers]), analysed in J. Sarra,Rescue! The Companies’Creditors Arrangement
Act 2nd edition (Thomson Reuters Canada Limited 2013), 60–61..
41 A. Sen, The Idea of Justice (Penguin Books), 51.
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ally.42 Finally, respondents also referred to the relative ease with which some
suppliers may be able to avoid entering into the sorts of long-term contracts
which would be caught by the new provision. There is some evidence of this in
the US. Whilst creditors who are bound by long-term contracts may be
obliged to supply,43 there is evidence in the US literature of many suppliers
avoiding these sorts of arrangements through their contracting arrangements
and demanding much the same priority treatment as a ‘critical vendor’ in
bankruptcy as we are familiar with in England.44
It is in part for these reasons that I suggested that the scope of the moratorium
should not be fixed. I suggested instead that a menu of options should be
available, such as a no termination provision, a stay of certain classes of
creditor, a stay of all creditors and stays of other proceedings. The benefit of
this approach, from the debtor company’s perspective, is that it would be able
to restrict or expand the moratorium to the matters which it considered needed
to be covered, but it would also enable the independent court to scrutinise the
fairness of the moratorium proposal. Further inspiration might be drawn here
from the Canadian CCAA. In the first edition of her leading text, Janis Sarra
describes the CCAA as providing, ‘a court-supervised process to facilitate the
negotiation of compromises and arrangements where companies are experien-
cing financial distress, in order to allow them to devise a survival strategy that
is acceptable to all their creditors.’45 The first stage of the CCAA process is
ordinarily to obtain an initial order and an initial stay, but a stay is not an
essential component of CCAA proceedings, and the court will be alive to
suggestions that the CCAA application is merely an effort by the debtor to
avoid its obligations to its creditors, or to suggestions that creditors have lost
all confidence in management.46 Crucially, for our purposes, the court has
discretion not only as to whether or not to order a stay, but also as to the scope
of the stay. I suggested that this sort of flexibility is welcomed because the
point at issue may vary from case to case In some circumstances, the important
issue may be restricting the triggering of cross default clauses or staying
dissenting creditors, whilst maintaining (to the maximum extent possible) the
functioning of the debtor company in a business as usual manner, whilst in
42 See, for example, A. Greenspan, The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World
(Allen Lane 2007), p. 15 ‘The spreading of a commercial rule of law and especially the
protection of the rights to property has fostered a worldwide entrepreneurial stirring’.
43 11 U.S.C. § 362.
44 M.J. Roe and F. Tang, ‘Breaking Bankruptcy Priority: How Rent-Seeking Upends the
Creditors’ Bargain’ (2013) 99 Va. L. Rev. 1254-1257.
45 J. Sarra, Rescue! The Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, 1st edition (Thomson
Reuters Canada Limited 2007), 1.
46 J. Sarra, Rescue! The Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, 2nd edition (Thomson
Reuters Canada Limited 2013), 55–58.
483Reflections on English Law SchemesECFR 3/2018
Brought to you by | London School of Economics and Political Science
Authenticated
Download Date | 10/28/19 3:15 PM
others it may be crucial to mandate continued supply. One issue which has
arisen is what Professor Sarra describes as ‘the problem of overreach’;47 ever-
more complex draft orders designed to cater for every eventuality but often
required in a short time frame and with little notice to creditors. She describes
efforts by the profession to draft model orders, which appear to have gone
some way towards mitigating this problem. We may also wish to draw further
inspiration from regimes which entitle the debtor to “turn off” termination
rights in contracts in other group companies to the extent they arise solely as a
result of the restructuring of the finance or parent company.
For the moment, however, and as already described, the Government response
envisages a less-flexible moratorium based on the existing moratorium in
administration. This may be, in part, because the Government response con-
firms that the moratorium will be obtained by paper filing only with the
courts, unless a creditor launches a challenge to the stay. The European
Commission proposal is not altogether clear, referring to judicial or adminis-
trative authorities, but also referring to a stay being ‘ordered’,48 and providing
that the stay should not be granted when creditors are unfairly prejudiced
setting out detailed factors which the judicial or administrative authorities may
take into account in establishing unfair prejudice.49 It will be clear from this
discussion that, although I am generally in favour of reducing the court’s role
to an administrative filing function where possible, I can see considerable
benefit in an initial hearing at which the moratorium is sought. One such
advantage is that this would facilitate a flexible structure of the sort already
described. Another is that it would mitigate some of the disadvantages which
many respondents noted in their replies to the Insolvency Service consultation
of putting all the work in disputing the moratorium on the creditor, who may
be poorly resourced and not particularly literate in the insolvency system. Of
course, it only provides some small remedy for these effects, not least because
there will be limitations on notice to creditors. Yet it does at least provide a
forum in which concerns can fairly easily be aired by the judge.
47 J. Sarra, Rescue! The Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, , 2nd edition (Thomson
Reuters Canada Limited 2013), 85–87..
48 European Commission proposal Article 6(2).
49 European Commission proposal Article 6. These are whether the stay would preserve
the overall value of the estate, whether the debtor acts in bad faith or with the intention
of causing prejudice and whether the debtor generally acts against the legitimate expec-
tations of the general body of creditors and, in the case of a single creditor or class of
creditors whether their claims would be made substantially worse-off as a result of the
stay than if the stay was not granted or if the creditor is put more at a disadvantage than
other creditors in a similar position.
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The European Commission proposal suggests that the stay should be lifted
when creditors are unfairly prejudiced, referring to the factors identified
above. In the Government response the UKGovernment confirms that it plans
to take a similar legislative approach as seen in administration as it considers,
for the most part, that the same principles will apply in a case of a creditor
applying to court to have a moratorium lifted.50 In English insolvency law the
approach to the lifting of the moratorium in administration is relatively well-
developed in case law:
– Would lifting the stay impede the administration?
– If it would, and the applicant is a secured creditor, the property rights of
the secured creditor will be balanced against the rights of the other cred-
itors (giving weight to the proprietary interest)
– If it would, and the applicant is an unsecured creditor seeking leave to
enforce a contract, would the court have granted an injunction or an order
for specific performance if the company were not in administration and, if
the court would have done so, would enforcement frustrate the adminis-
tration?
– Where the claim is purely monetary, the stay will rarely be lifted
In its recent report, the ABI Commission recommended that an unsecured
creditor should be permitted to compel performance of its contract ‘if the court
determines, after notice and a hearing, that the harm to the non-debtor party
resulting from the trustee’s non-performance significantly outweighs the ben-
efit to the estate derived from such non-performance’ (see page 116). This
would seem to be similar to the English approach. For secured creditors, the
US position is more complex and depends, in part, on the type of security
which the creditor has been granted.
Cram down
Schemes of arrangement have been used in the financial crisis to swap the debt
of highly leveraged businesses, which is typically secured (so that the company
voluntary arrangement or CVA route is not available), into equity. Although it
is possible to cram a scheme of arrangement onto minority creditors within a
class, it is not possible to cram a scheme of arrangement onto a dissenting class.
English common lawyers have overcome this challenge by “twinning” the
scheme of arrangement with a pre-packaged administration sale of the business
50 Insolvency and Corporate Governance Government Response 26 August 2018, 49.
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and assets to a new company, stranding creditors in the dissenting class in a
shell company with no assets.51 Although this has proved a workable solution,
it undoubtedly uses the pre-packaged administration sale in a way which was
not envisaged by the legislature, and the Insolvency Service has suggested that
cram down between classes is something which should now be specifically
addressed. The European Commission proposal also sets out a plan for what it
calls cross-class cram down. I agree that it is time to address the way in which
English law permits imposition of a debt-for-equity swap in a large corporate
situation on a dissenting class.
The first option would be to reform the scheme of arrangement procedure
itself to permit such a cram down. This gives rise to the following considera-
tions:
– As mentioned above, schemes of arrangement are currently found in the
Companies Act 2006. This is one of the procedure’s great strengths
because it reduces stigma and increases certainty (as review provisions of
insolvency law relating to avoidance of transactions, directors’ duties and
the like are not engaged). Some jurisdictions have concluded that it would
be inappropriate to allow cram down of a scheme on a dissenting class
outside insolvency legislation. However, in other jurisdictions it may be
possible to cram a scheme down on a class within a corporate law scheme.
Further research would be beneficial here.
– If there is an imperative for recognition for the purposes of the World
Bank Rankings, a cram down outside insolvency legislation may not be
eligible for ranking purposes.
– We may want to give some thought as to whether the new cram down
provisions can be adapted for use with other insolvency procedures.
Overall, this would suggest that one way forward might be a new procedure,
based on the scheme of arrangement, but located in the Insolvency Act 1986
and permitting a debt-for-equity swap to be crammed down on a dissenting
class. The Government response confirms that a new restructuring plan proce-
dure is envisaged with no qualifying financial conditions. This raises the
question of how the new restructuring plan procedure will interact with the
existing options. For example:
– It is suggested that a mechanism should be incorporated to convert a
scheme of arrangement (in the Companies Act 2006) into the new restruc-
51 For a fuller description see S.Paterson, ‘Bargaining in Financial Restructuring: Market
Norms, Legal Rights and Regulatory Standards’ (2014) 14(2) JCLS 333.
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turing plan procedure. There is already precedent for this in the mechan-
isms in English lawwhich permit conversion from of a company voluntary
liquidation into a compulsory liquidation. There is also precedent in
Canada, where two different insolvency regimes sit alongside each other
for the purposes of achieving a debt restructuring (the CCAA, already
discussed, and the proposal provisions of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency
Act),52 and provision is made to allow a proceeding to be converted from
one statute to another under certain conditions.
– Should a scheme of arrangement “twinned” with a pre-packaged adminis-
tration be prohibited if it is merely an attempt to avoid the requirements of
the new restructuring plan procedure (as is currently the case for a sub rosa
chapter 11 plan)?
– Should the review provisions of insolvency law relating to avoidance of
transactions, directors’ duties and the like be engaged in the restructuring
plan procedure?
One further consequence of the lack of a formal cram down procedure in
English law, and the pragmatic use of the scheme of arrangement coupled with
the pre-packaged administration to fill that gap, is that there has been no
legislative debate as to the appropriate valuation standard which should be used
when a plan is imposed on financial creditors. Uncertainty creates issues for
financial creditors,who areunable toprice the riskof default if theydonotknow
which valuation standard will be applied to determine whether they are in the
money or out of the money, and valuation is a thorny issue. The Insolvency
Service consultation document appeared to suggest that a minimum standard is
adopted (no creditor worse off than in liquidation), leaving it to the courts to
decidewhether someother standard shouldbe applied in aparticular case. There
were a wide variety of responses on this issue, but I, and many other respon-
dents, considered that this is not a matter which should be left to develop
through the courts, and that if a cram down provision is to be introduced we
must determine which valuation standard we wish to adopt when a plan of
reorganisation is imposed on dissenting creditors. The complicated choices
around valuation standard were not addressed in the Insolvency Service con-
sultation document, but the Government response concludes that valuation
should be determined by reference to the next best alternative for creditors if the
52 Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c. B-3, as amended (BIA). It is also possible
to implement a restructuring in Canada under the Canadian Business Corporations Act
(CBCA) R.S.C. 1985 c. C-44 as amended. For a discussion see Sarra, Rescue! The
Companies’Creditors Arrangement Act, 2nd edition (Thomson Reuters Canada Limited
2013) at 12, 36–46.
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restructuring plan was not to be agreed.53 This contrasts with the European
Commission proposal, which appears to largely adopt the approach in chap-
ter 11. It is, then, necessary to consider the two broad approaches to the valua-
tion question currently adopted in corporate debt restructuring in order to
evaluate the relativemerit of the different valuation standards.54
Counterfactual approach
The counterfactual approach is the approach traditionally adopted by English
law.
In short, it requires the court to consider whether creditors are worse off in the
proposed restructuring than they would be if the restructuring did not go
ahead. This is sometimes described as the liquidation standard, but in fact it is
more nuanced than that label would suggest. In the MyTravel case, the coun-
terfactual was a liquidation of the business, because there was evidence that if
the restructuring did not go ahead the Civil Aviation Authority would revoke
MyTravel’s operating licence so that it would not be able to continue to operate
as a going concern.55 However, these facts are unusual and generally the
counterfactual will be a going concern sale of the company’s business and
assets by an administrator.
Even where a going concern valuation is adopted, there are nonetheless criti-
cisms of the English approach which concentrates on the market price for the
business at the time of the restructuring. Both procedural and substantive
criticisms are raised. Insofar as procedure is concerned, the counterfactual
value is often established by a short bidding process for the company’s busi-
ness and assets, but in many cases this may not be a real auction process
because bidders are unwilling to commit to it if they suspect the process is
merely a means to establish a price to benchmark a restructuring, rather than a
genuine sale process. Moreover, if senior lenders are confident that they are in
the money on the counterfactual basis, they have little incentive to reach a
negotiated settlement and may prefer resorting rapidly to the legal process.
There are also a number of substantive issues. Restructurings often occur when
either the market is depressed, or the particular sector in which the seller
53 Insolvency and Corporate Governance Government Response 26 August 2018, 74.
54 For more detail see S.Paterson, ‘Bargaining in Financial Restructuring: Market Norms,
Legal Rights and Regulatory Standards’ (2014) 14(2) JCLS 333; S. Paterson, ‘Rethinking
the Role of Corporate Bankruptcy Theory in the Twenty-first Century’ (2016) 36(4)
OJLS 697.
55 ReMyTravel Group Plc [2004] EWCACiv 1734; [2005] 2 BCLC 123.
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operates is distressed, so that trade buyers in the same sector lack financing to
make a bid, or there may be a shortage of bid financing generally, or potential
buyers may simply be conserving their reserves. Moreover, the sale agreement
will often be drafted on insolvency terms, in other words, without any repre-
sentations and warranties, indemnities etc. For both these reasons the price
may be lower than the price which would be obtained for the business in a
more normal market on more normal arms’ length terms. Thus, if the business
is valued on this basis, senior creditors may take the lion’s share of the equity
in a debt-for-equity swap, but as the market and the business recovers, may
subsequently recover more than they were owed.
The bargaining and litigation approach
As a result, a different approach is used in US bankruptcy in chapter 11,
sometimes referred to as the bargaining and litigation approach.56 Here, each
creditor class retains its own expert to value the business and assets of the
company using standard valuation methodology such as comparable transac-
tion pricing, discounted cash flow (or DCF) and leveraged buyout pricing. If
the parties do not reach agreement, there may be a valuation hearing in the
chapter 11 process which the bankruptcy judge will arbitrate.
There are several advantages to this approach. The first is that it is arguably
fairer because it does more to prevent the situation in which senior creditors
grab a significant proportion of the equity when the market is depressed.
Secondly, we may prefer this approach if the money which is at stake in junior
tranches of the capital structure has been invested by pension funds, insurance
funds etc. so that it is money which belongs to us all. Thirdly, we may prefer it
if it increases the availability of credit or reduces its cost. Fourthly, we may
prefer it if we consider it will do more to attract international investors to UK
debt structures. Finally, this approach may do more to incentivise a negotiated
settlement because all parties fear the litigation risk and expense inherent in a
court valuation fight. In other words, senior creditors may be incentivised to
give something to junior classes to effectively buy out any ability which they
have to hold up implementation of the plan of reorganisation by forcing the
matter into a contentious court hearing.
However, the US approach also has serious disadvantages. First, out-of-the
money creditors may fear the valuation fight less than senior creditors (having
less to lose) and thus capture returns which they ought properly not to be
56 D.G. Baird and D.S. Bernstein, ‘Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the
Reorganization Bargain’ (2006) 115(8) The Yale Law Journal 1930.
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entitled to. Secondly, negotiations can become very protracted, costing signifi-
cant amounts and delaying rehabilitation of the company. Finally, the ap-
proach is very subjective so that the result is somewhat unpredictable, and the
judge hearing the valuation dispute may, as Judge James Peck has put it, feel
gamed. Thus it is the subject of much debate in the US at the moment, with
some practitioners arguing for the UK approach or, at least, a different
approach.
Options approach
The issue has recently been considered in the US as part of the American
Bankruptcy Institute (ABI) Commission on Reform of Chapter 11. Specifi-
cally, the Commission considered whether some variant of the so-called op-
tions approach should be adopted. Several US academics have advanced the
idea of the options approach, in which out-of-the money creditors would
receive an option with a strike price equal to the debt ranking ahead of them
and a defined exercise period, which could be traded in the market and which
would assume a higher value if the business recovered rapidly following the
debt restructuring.57 The ABI Commission report uses options pricing metho-
dology as a starting point in order to determine whether creditors who are
out-of-the money today should receive some consideration in the restructur-
ing. However, the author’s impression is that the idea has not been greeted
with much enthusiasm in the market, the idea is not reflected in either of the
consultations under consideration and it would seem to add to, rather than
reduce, complexity. Accordingly, it is not discussed in more detail here.
Determining a way forward
There is little detailed analysis on the issue in the InsolvencyService consultation
and Government response, and none in the European Commission proposal.
Yet the choice between these two broad approaches is not to be taken lightly.
The first point which requires consideration is the argument around which
approach is fairer. In a recent paper, I have suggested that we need to be careful
about howwe think about fairness in the context of debt restructuring involving
57 L. Bebchuk, ‘A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations’ (1988) 101(4) Harv. L.
Rev. 775; P. Aghion, O. Hart and J. Moore, ‘The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform’
(1992) 8(3) J. Law Econ. Org. 523; O. Hart, Firms, Contracts and Financial Services
(Oxford University Press 1995); L. Bebchuk, ‘Using Options to Divide Value in
Corporate Bankruptcy’ (2000) 44(4) Eur Econ Rev 829.
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large, sophisticated creditors.58 The paper divides fairness concerns into two,
broad groups comprising what I have called issues of substantive fairness and
issues of procedural fairness. Drawing on awide range of literature fromdiverse
fields such as moral and political philosophy, biological sciences, psychology,
organisation theory, group theory and economics I sought to build an analytical
framework to assess fairness concerns in small and medium sized debt restruc-
turings (which donot implicate the schemeof arrangement procedure and so are
relevant for this account in only one small way which will become apparent in a
moment), and a large corporate restructuring in which debt restructuring pro-
ceeds were allocated based on the English counterfactual approach andwithout
a US-style valuation battle. My principal categories of substantive fairness were
the principle of equal treatment for equally situated creditors (dealt with in the
scheme of arrangement procedure by careful class classification and the other
procedural safeguards), the principle of deservingness (getting one’s due), the
principle of consent or responsibility for outcomes, the principle of legitimate
expectation, the principle that losses should not fall on those least able to bear
themandwhatMarkWarren calls a ‘pathological formof fairness’,59 the desire to
see the party who has done us wrong suffer. Insofar as procedural fairness is
concerned, I focused on voice for those affected by the decision in the process,
lack of bias and protection against abuse of power. Working carefully through
each of these categories, I sought to show that they are each of greater concern in
small and medium sized debt restructuring, where the creditors have very
different levels of bargaining power and sophistication, than in the large corpo-
rate debt restructuring where the original investment decision was made by a
sophisticated creditor with access to professional advice and the full range of
investment opportunities available to him. There is neither space nor time to
cover that separate paper here, and interested readers are directed towards it. For
the moment, the point is made that we must be very careful about the precise
‘fairness’ concernwhich guides us in balancing thedifferent policyobjectives.
Even if the differential fairness analysis is disputed, it is not at all clear that
the primary method of valuation in US chapter 11, the discounted cash flow,
is to be preferred as intrinsically fairer. In a recent paper, Arturo Cifuentes
briefly tracks the history of the discounted cash flow method applied to
valuation.60 He points us to Joel Dean’s work in the 1950s in developing the
58 S. Paterson, ‘Debt Restructuring and Notions of Fairness’ (2017) 80(4) MLR 600.
59 M.E. Warren, ‘Democracy and the Everyday Origins of Fairness’ in J.P. Sarra (ed) An
Exploration of Fairness: Interdisciplinary Inquiries in Law, Science and the Humanities
(Canada: Carswell, 2013).
60 A. Cifuentes, ‘The Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) Method Applied to Valuation: Too
Many Uncomfortable Truths’ available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2845341 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2845341.
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DCF approach by analogy with bond valuation as the right tool for valuing
financial assets.61 However, he shows how (absent issuer credit risk) the future
cash flows of a bond are well-defined. Of course, when we are considering a
business, cash flows are inherently uncertain. As Cifuentes puts it, ‘... the
probabilistic distribution of cash flows is not bounded: we can get more, or we
can get less than expected. The distribution is two-sided. There is upside and
downside potential.’62 He also points to the problems of estimating the correct
discount rate using the weighted average cost of capital (which is ‘feasible, at
best, for firms that have publicly traded debt and equity’63), and the use of a
single discount rate to two cash flows with different risk profiles. Overall,
Cifuentes argues that the DCF ‘attempts to transform a problem which is
probabilistic in nature (cash flows are uncertain) into a deterministic problem
by appealing to the “right” discount rate’64 (reminiscent of attempts by one set
of financial advisers in a well-known English case to use Monte Carlo simula-
tion methodology precisely to aim at characterising the problem probabilisti-
cally – an attempt which met with very great disfavour from the judge).65 The
important point here is that this unease with the use of DCF methodology is
not being raised specifically in the context of corporate bankruptcy. In another
recent paper, Michael Simkovic has shown how concerns such as these are
causing US bankruptcy courts to consider moving away from DCF and
comparable transaction methodology to newer methods based on market
prices.66 He goes so far as to call this a ‘time of transition between methods of
financial analysis’,67 as courts look for newer corporate finance methods which
can be ‘more objective, less susceptible to hindsight bias, harder to manipulate,
and less expensive to implement.’68 In the context of debt restructuring in
chapter 11 he concludes, ‘the rise of 363 sales is driven in part by preferences
for market valuations through a judicially supervised auction process rather
than purely judicial valuations.’69 There is, therefore, a risk that we turn
61 J. Dean,Capital Budgeting (Columbia University Press, 1951).
62 A. Cifuentes, ‘The Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) Method Applied to Valuation: Too
Many Uncomfortable Truths’ available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2845341 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2845341.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Re Bluebrook [2009] EWHC 2114 (Ch).
66 M. Simkovic, ‘The Evolution of Valuation in Bankruptcy’ (2017) 91 Am. Bankr. L. J.
299.
67 Ibid., 300.
68 Ibid., 304.
69 Ibid., 304, citing D.G. Baird and R. Rasmussen, ‘The End of Bankruptcy’ (2002) 55
Stan. L. Rev. 751, 758, 785-88, 789; D.A. Skeel Jr., ‘The Nature and Effect of Corporate
Voting in chapter 11 Reorganisation Cases’ (1992) 78 Va. L. Rev. 461–533, 496-98;
J. Berge, ‘An Efficiency Model of Section 363(b) Sales’ (2006) 92 Va. L. Rev. 1639-1685,
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towards DCF and comparable valuation methodology just as the US turns
away from it.
Even if one points to the fact that much of the money involved is pension fund
and insurance money and belongs to us all, it is not at all clear that the DCF
and comparable transaction methodology (with all its inherent subjectivity and
somewhat vague application) produces a ‘fairer’ outcome. Simkovic points to
the cost of the exercise which can be vast. Valuation is crucial to many different
aspects of the US chapter 11 process, and Simkovic tells us that the in the
Caesers Entertainment case the financial advisers sought approval for over
$17 million for financial analysis. It is clear that this goes far beyond the work
which we are concerned with in the present context, but it does give an
indication of the risks of increasing the role of professional advisers in the
process. It is also the case that even if junior creditors or shareholders are
successful in lobbying for a stake in the restructuring proceeds through the
DCF and comparable transaction valuation exercise, the amount which they
will receive will often be pretty small.
In the ‘fairness’ piece, I noted that we might still be concerned if our choice of
valuation methodology had an impact on the availability and cost of credit in
the primary market. This brings us to the vexed issue of the relationship
between debt restructuring law and the availability and cost of credit. Legal
scholarship often states that insolvency law has an influence on both, but also
often as an intuition and without much empirical support. This is, of course,
because the investment decision is influenced by so many factors that it is
almost impossible to isolate restructuring law’s contribution (if any). But it is
arguably crucial to our decision on the choice between valuation standards in
cram down. At the outset, two broad intuitions present themselves. The first is
that senior lenders may be more willing to permit subordinated borrowing if
restructuring law protects their rights. But the second is that junior lenders
may only be prepared to lend if their position is protected on default. Against a
normative concern for the availability and cost of capital, these two intuitions
may lead us towards some sort of balance between senior and junior creditor
rights after the US model. However, my research suggests a somewhat differ-
ent answer.
In my work in 2012 I found important differences in the capital structures of
leveraged debt deals in the UK and in the US.70 I pointed to the fact that in
1644, 1671; H.R. Miller and S.Y. Waisman, ‘Is chapter 11 Bankrupt?’ (2005) 47 B.C.
L. Rev. 129, 172-73; J.M. LoPucki and J.W. Doherty, ‘Bankruptcy Fire Sales’ (2007) 106
Mich. L. Rev.; J.J. White, ‘Bankruptcy Noir’ (2008) 106 Mich. L. Rev. 691–719; 691-92.
70 S. Paterson, ‘The Adaptive Capacity of Markets and Convergence in Law: UK High
Yield Issuers, US Investors and Insolvency Law’ (2015) 78(3) MLR 431.
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the US high yield bonds were typically part of what we might call a
‘traditional’ structure, in which the high yield bond is subordinated to a
senior secured loan with a revolving credit facility, whilst in the UK issuers
were increasingly combining loan and bond debt in the secured part of the
deal structure. The purpose of the article was to consider the consequences of
capital structure for pressure for change in valuation approach (which I
return to below), but I wondered in passing whether the comparatively less
favourable conditions for junior bondholders in the UK also contributed to
the differences in capital structure. However, evidence in the market since
then suggests that corporate restructuring law (and anticipated recovery
return on default) does not have had much to do with it. Instead, the
availability of (cheaper) all senior deals appear to be a function of conditions
in the leveraged finance market. In their European Leveraged Loan Chart
Book 2016, Fitch point out that ‘Structures with senior secured notes sitting
alongside senior loans saw an increase in leverage between 2011-2012 and
2013-14 whilst pricing declined driven by investor’s “search for yield”’ but
that ‘In 2015, few leveraged buyouts have seen senior secured notes together
with senior loans and leverage has declined whilst pricing has increased, as
risk appetite for new HY-funded LBOs fell amid increasing volatility. The
number of refinancings has reduced in 2015 but deals have seen further
increases in leverage and pricing pressure as borrowers took advantage of
existing investor bases. High-yield notes increasingly became an unsecured/
subordinated instrument in 2013-2014, helping borrowers increase financial
leverage.’71 This is echoed by S&P who state, ‘Looking at the deal structures
that we track on a quarterly basis ..., there is an increase in “traditional”
structures – a senior secured loan with an accompanying revolving credit
facility – in the first quarter of 2016, when deal execution in the bond market
was difficult. When the bond market reopened in the second quarter, issuers
began to structure all-bond transactions, as well as combine loan and bond
debt in the senior secured part of the deal structure.’72 It seems, then, that
market conditions, and not restructuring law, are driving capital structure
decisions – it’s the market, stupid!
Fitch’s Country-Specific Treatment of Recovery Ratings provides some inter-
esting colour for this analysis.73 Fitch’s recovery analysis methodology applies
restructuring analysis to the rating notches of debt instruments. Most of this
methodology is not jurisdiction sensitive. The key country-specific treatment
71 European Leveraged Loan Chart Book – 2Q2016 FitchRatings July 2016, 19–20.
72 Leveraged Finance: Borrower-Friendly Credit Conditions Endure as the European
Leveraged Finance Market Shrugs off Brexit Uncertainty 8 August, 2016 S&P Global
Ratings.
73 FitchRatingsCountry Specific Treatment of Recovery Ratings 18 October 2016.
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of recovery ratings appears to be the ‘soft caps’ to instrument ratings for a
particular jurisdiction. Countries have been separated into groupings of the
world’s jurisdictions based on PhilipWood’sMaps of World Financial Law and
each legal group has been assigned a cap.74 Jurisdictions have then been ranked
according to the World Bank’s Distance to Frontier (DTF) data with specific
cut-off points for each jurisdictional group. There are four groups: Group A
can be rated up to ‘RR1’; Group B can be rated up to ‘RR2’; Group C can be
rated up to ‘RR3’ and Group D can be rated up to ‘RR4’. But here is the crucial
point. Group A, which comprises ‘Jurisdictions that generally support the
priority of claims on bankruptcy and display other features that are deemed to
be generally creditor-friendly, including generally reliable enforceability’ so
that ‘the legal and political environment provides no cap to RRs’75 includes the
UK, USA, Germany, Netherlands, Australia and Japan. In other words, even
where differences in corporate restructuring law between jurisdictions are
taken into account for the purposes of assessing the recovery rates of debt
when it is issued in the primary market, only broad differences seem to go to
the analysis and not specific differences such as valuation methodology.
At first sight, empirical work in the finance literature appears to undermine
this broad ‘country bucket’ approach to corporate restructuring and insol-
vency law, but a closer examination may support it. Davydenko and Franks
find fascinating evidence of banks adjusting their lending and reorganisation
practices to mitigate what they term ‘costly aspects of bankruptcy law’.76
However, crucially their research focuses on lending by domestic banks to
small and medium sized enterprises. We would expect to find domestic banks
lending to this riskier group of borrowers with detailed knowledge of (and
perhaps bias for) their home jurisdiction approaching their credit decision in a
different way from lenders in large, complex, international capital structures,
particularly as commercial banks have extensive teams which specialise in
screening and monitoring business debtors and legal teams with detailed
knowledge of the domestic legal regime.77 This is heightened by the fact that
Davydenko and Franks focused on secured lending, comparing collateral
demands in France and Germany with collateral demands in England in the era
of ‘administrative receivership’when a small group of domestic banks was able
74 P. Wood,Maps of World Financial Law (Sweet &Maxwell 2008).
75 FitchRatingsCountry Specific Treatment of Recovery Ratings 18 October 2016.
76 S. Davydenko and J. Franks, ‘Do Bankruptcy Codes Matter?’ (2008) The Journal of
Finance Issue 2 April 2008, 565.
77 J. Armour, A. Menezes, M. Uttamchandani and K. Van Zwieten, ‘How Do Creditor
Rights Matter for Debt Finance? A Review of Empirical Evidence’ in F. Dahan (ed)
Research Handbook on Secured Financing in Commercial Transactions (Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar Publishing 2015).
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to rely on careful monitoring and extra-judicial enforcement of secured credit
covering all or substantially all of the firm’s assets on default.78 The credit
assessment for a fund investing in a complex, international capital structure is
likely to be very different: monitoring is costly; investors are numerous and
dispersed; and the fund lacks the portofolio management and restructuring
resources of a large European domestic bank and may actively trade debt
positions in the secondary market across its portfolio.79 Considered from this
perspective this gives rise to a new intuition: that whilst domestic banks may
pay relatively closer attention to the detail of the corporate restructuring and
insolvency legal regime (particularly when advancing secured credit to SMEs),
funds and other investors who more habitually invest in junior debt are more
likely to take a generalised approach to the legal environment closer to the
‘general legal ethos’ idenitifed by Fitch.
In this context, Becker and Stromberg consider an event study around a change
in the duties of directors in Delaware when a company is financially distressed
which was favourable to creditors.80 They find that leverage did increase but
‘by a relatively small amount.’81 They also suggest that the decision was
followed by longer maturities and less use of covenants,82 but found the
reduction in covenants primarily in firms closer to distress.83 Crucially, they do
not find any evidence of a change in interest cost.84 In other words, the change
in law does not seem to have been significant enough to change the overall way
in which investors viewed corporate restructuring and insolvency law risk.
Rodano, Serrano-Velarde and Taratino study the effects of Italian bankruptcy
law reform of 2005-2006 on the cost of loan financing.85 Fascinatingly, and
perhaps counter-intuitively, they find that the introduction of a reorganisation
(or restructuring) procedure actually increased the interest rates in loan finan-
cing. In other words, the reform was sufficiently significant to change the way
in which investors viewed corporate restructuring and insolvency law in Italy,
but changed it in a negative way. On closer inspection, this is entirely consis-
tent with the ‘country bucket’ approach. There appears to be weak confidence
78 See J. Armour and S. Frisby, ‘Rethinking Receivership’ (2001) 21 OJLS 73.
79 See, for example, T.Cox, D, Malone and M. Sinjakli, ‘Investing in Distressed Debt in
Europe: an Overview’ in I. B. Aldana (ed) Investing in Distressed Debt in Europe
(Globe Law and Business Ltd 2016), 18.
80 B. Becker and P. Stromberg, ‘Fiduciary Duties and Equity-debtholder Conflicts’ (2012)
25(6) Rev. Financ. Stud. 1931.
81 Ibid., 1953.
82 Ibid., 1955.
83 Ibid., 1956.
84 Ibid., 1954.
85 G. Rodano, N. Serrano-Velarde and E. Tarantino, ‘The Casual Effect of Bankruptcy
Law on the Cost of Finance’ available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1967485.
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in Italian insitutions in corporate restructuring and insolvency, whilst the new
regime prescribed that the debtor should be the sole party entitled to open the
procedure and put forward the restructuring plan, provided the debtor with a
powerful automatic stay against creditor actions during plan development and
provided the courts with the ability to impose a plan in the face of creditor
dissent in certain circumstances. This appears to have exacerbated creditor
concerns about the overall Italian corporate restructuring and insolvency law
environment, so that ‘worse repayment incentives outweigh efficiency gains
from greater creditor coordination.’86
Recent work in an entirely different area also supports this ‘country bucket’
analysis, and reinforces the idea that whether a change in law has an impact,
and whether that impact is positive or negative, depends not only on the
substantive change itself but also on how it interacts with the pre-existing
perception of the general legal environment by investors. Hans Christensen,
Luzi Hail and Christian Leuz have examined the capital-markets effects of
changes in securities regulation in the EU aimed at reducing market abuse and
increasing transparency.87 They find that the reforms increased market liquid-
ity but that the effects were stronger in countries already perceived as having
stricter securities regulation so that ‘countries with initially weaker regulation
do not catch up with stronger countries, and that countries diverge more upon
harmonising regulation.’88 Two factors appear to be particularly important.
First, the pre-existing market conditions reflect ‘insitutional, market, and
political forces (or constraints) that are still at play when the new rules are
introduced.’89 Secondly, ‘a country’s past track record with respect to imple-
menting regulation is likely to be revealing about its political will to put in
place regulation that induces (or curbs) socially (un)desirable behaviour.’90 Of
course, this has far-reaching implications for the European restructuring har-
monisation proposal outside the scope of this paper (including that the effect
of incorporating stronger moratorium protection in England, which is gener-
ally perceived to be a creditor-friendly regime, may be less significant than the
effect of incorporating it in other EU Member States’ insolvency regimes
where creditors have less confidence in the overall legal environment). For the
moment, the point is that what may matter most for the availability and cost of
86 Ibid., 17.
87 H.B. Christensen, L. Hail and C. Leuz, ‘Capital-Markets Effects of Securities Regula-
tion: Prior Conditions, Implementation, and Enforcement’ Chicago Booth Research
Paper No. 12–04. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1745105 or http://dx.
doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1745105.
88 Ibid., 1.
89 Ibid., 11.
90 Ibid., 11.
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credit in complex capital structures for large firms (of the sort likely to resort
to the scheme of arrangement procedure) is not the detail of the corporate
restructuring and insolvency regime, but rather the general perception of the
legal environment, and that the impact which a reform has on availability and
cost of credit in a particular jurisdiction will depend, in part, on how it changes
that perception. Given English courts’ generally credit market-friendly ap-
proach, and the deep and expert pool of lawyers working in this area in
London, it is suggested here that a decision to retain the traditional European
counterfactual approach in determining the allocation of restructuring pro-
ceeds is unlikely to cause capital to flow out of English cases, at least in firms
some distance from default.
Nonetheless, let us suppose, for the moment, that all of the detail of restructur-
ing law doesmatter for the availability and cost of junior debt and shareholder
equity. We should still ask whether we care. One of the issues highlighted
during the financial crisis was that banks and other financial institutions had
been able to borrow too cheaply because of an assumption in the market that
governments would not allow them to fail.91 This was objectionable in part
because it proved to be correct; governments around the world stepped in to
use taxpayers’ money to restore banks’ balance sheets. Thus part of the
regulatory response after the crisis has been designed to ensure that the
industry will henceforth bear the costs of its mistakes, so that financial institu-
tion debt must be re-priced to reflect this. But it is also an acknowledgment of
the broader role which mispriced debt played in the crisis. Many bankruptcy
scholars have highlighted the role which insolvency law plays in the availabil-
ity and cost of credit in the market for debt for healthy companies.92 Yet this is
normally described in only one direction: if insolvency law is not sufficiently
(secured) creditor friendly, sources of finance may diminish or pricing may go
up. The financial crisis showed us that we do not necessarily want a limitless
supply of cheap money. Indeed, it highlighted the risks of distress if there is
too much leverage in the system, the ‘zombie company’ problem caused by
debt overhang and the risk if investors make assumptions about the liquidity
and depth of the secondary market (so that the investment model assumes that
the investor will be able to trade out should the need arise). At the time of
writing, growing leverage (and aggressively borrower friendly terms) are caus-
ing renewed anxiety amongst regulators, with the ECB publishing an exposure
draft setting out regulatory guidelines consistent with US leveraged lending
91 A. Admati and M. Hellwig, The Bankers’ New Clothes (Princeton and Oxford: Prince-
ton University Press, 2013), 89; C.M. Reinhart and K.S. Rogoff This Time is Different:
Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press
2011), 145.
92 D. Baird, ‘Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms’ (1998) 108(3) The Yale Law Journal 573.
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guidelines.93 We may not mind if we have a restructuring law which is pre-
dictable and capable of comparatively rapid and cheap execution, but which
causes some price increase for risky junior debt to compensate pension funds
and insurance companies adequately, or if some companies are unable to
leverage their equity to the same extent because they are regarded as too risky.
Indeed, it may be that that is just how it should be.
Of course, all of this assumes that large corporate debt restructurings continue
much as they have evolved post-crisis: debt-for-debt or debt-for-equity swaps
to deleverage the balance sheet (sometimes accompanied by an injection of new
money) such that the financial liabilities are sufficient to absorb the losses. I
noted at the outset that we cannot be assured of this trajectory, and that
different ‘fairness’ considerations arise where trade credit is implicated.
Although, therefore, I am broadly in favour of the best alternative available to
the company in determining value, there may need to be a caveat to deal with
future developments. I return to this point at the end of the paper.
The final point made in favour of a US approach to the valuation question is
that the very unpredictability of the valuation dispute encourages bargaining.
Where this bargaining takes place in the context of the cost and complexity of
a pending chapter 11 dispute, it is not immediately obvious that it delivers the
usual benefits of a consensual deal in terms of speed and reduced cost. But
setting that to one side, creating an environment in which rational actors are
incentivised to bargain, so that any hold-out problem is reduced to the max-
imum extent possible must be a good thing, particularly if we focus on some of
our concerns for procedural fairness. This takes us to our final issue: whether
some sort of mediator should be introduced into the process.
TheMediator
One question raised during the ABI deliberations on chapter 11 is whether
some sort of independent mediator could be appointed to help mediate valua-
tion fights between the parties and, potentially, to assist the bankruptcy judge,
and the European Commission proposal suggests that Member States may
require the appointment of a practitioner in the field of restructuring where the
debtor is granted a general stay of enforcement actions or where the restructur-
ing plan needs to be confirmed by a judicial or administrative authority by
93 European Central Bank, Draft Guidance on Leveraged Transactions 23 November
2016, available at: https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/legalframework/public-
cons/pdf/leveraged_transactions/leveraged_transactions_guidance.en.pdf?fbd5fffbeb4-
daff043052e8a056d620b.
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means of a cross-class cram down.94 This is an idea which I have written about
in the UK context,95 where there is already a party well-positioned to take this
role, in the shape of the insolvency practitioner. In my work, I have focused on
the fact that in most cases the company will be arguing in favour of the
restructuring on the basis that it produces a better result for creditors as a
whole than the best available alternative option, which will often be an admin-
istration sale of the business and assets as a going concern. But for this analysis
to withstand scrutiny, the administrator-in-waiting must be convinced of the
case for moving to a sale transaction if the debt restructuring fails. This is
because paragraph 3(1)(a) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986 mandates
a rescue of the company as the first purpose of the administration unless the
administrator thinks that is not reasonably practicable and he acts in the best
interests of creditors, in which case he can move down the hierarchy of
purposes to a going concern sale.
In my earlier work I noted that paragraph 3 is a difficult paragraph, which has
been described by Armour and Mokal as ‘almost Delphic in its complexity.’96
But in my analysis I argued that the difficulties with the construction of the
hierarchy do not entitle the senior class to hold the administrator to ransom,
and refuse the debt restructuring plan, where the administrator considers
(weighing the interests of the different classes and the expected recovery in an
administration) that another, fairer scheme is available and the question is the
allocation of the debt and equity rather than strategic decisions such as who to
sell the business to.97 I therefore suggested that the Insolvency Practitioner
should have a role in a cram down scheme.
There has been some considerable scepticism about the IP as a neutral gate-
keeper in English insolvency law. It is suggested here that this scepticism has
arisen in part because of the historically close relationship between IPs and the
clearing banks which dominated the financial landscape in the UK. However,
this landscape has fundamentally changed, and there may be a role for an IP if
a new cram down provision is introduced. Indeed (although this would require
considerable thought) one solution to mediate between the rather blunt appli-
cation of the counterfactual valuation standard and the problems inherent in
moving towards the US valuation approach may be to provide the IP with a
role in deciding on the “fairness” of the restructuring plan, given not only the
apparent value in current market conditions, but also the forecasts for the
94 European Commission proposal Article 5.
95 S.Paterson, ‘Bargaining in Financial Restructuring: Market Norms, Legal Rights and
Regulatory Standards’ (2014) 14(2) JCLS 333.
96 J. Armour and R. Mokal, ‘Reforming Governance of Corporate Rescue: The Enterprise
Act 2002’ (2003) 1 Lloyds Maritime and Commercial LawQuarterly 28,41.
97 Ibid., 37 n 64.
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business. This could be bolstered by enhanced regulation setting out how the
IP should approach the valuation mediation role, new legal rights which
creditors could have to make representations to her, and new challenge rights
against the IP’s decision-making (perhaps not pitched as high as the current
thresholds to challenge IPs). Indeed, some inspiration could be taken from the
field of takeovers and the role of the independent adviser. Reform of this type
would be limited, however, to large corporate situations using the scheme of
arrangement or proposed restructuring plan procedure and it would be im-
portant for IPs willingness to take on the role that any challenge to the IPs
opinion is dealt with before sanction of the scheme.
Further inspiration might also be drawn once again from the Canadian CCAA
process (and a number of respondents highlighted this in their response to the
Insolvency Service consultation). If a stay is ordered in CCAA proceedings, a
monitor is appointed (and the court has discretion to order the appointment of a
monitor in other cases). Crucially, the court has discretion ‘to direct themonitor
to perform duties such as acting as liaison with the creditors and giving an
opinion on the debtor corporation’s ability tomeet the requirements of a revised
business plan.’98 Like the English law administrator, the monitor is an officer of
the court who can provide a dual function as the court’s officer in holding the
ring in commercial discussions between the stakeholders and in reporting to the
court. But unlike the English law administrator, she does not replace the com-
pany’s directors and the company’s governance structure continues through the
process. Janis Sarra notes, ‘Monitors increasingly navigate the debtor company
through the complexity of the CCAA process, providing business judgment,
negotiation skills and financial advice. The monitor can act as mediator or
facilitator, bringing theparties together in an effort tobuild consensuson aviable
going forward business plan.’99 In developing this role for the monitor the
Canadian courts have consistently emphasised the need for the monitor to act
independently, and their repeated emphasis on this point appears to have been
crucial in theperceptionofmarket players and trust in themonitor role.100
The Government response concludes that where a preliminary moratorium is
in place a Monitor should be appointed who should, for the moment, be a
regulated insolvency practitioner. However, the response also envisages a
relatively limited role for the Monitor and that there would be no Supervisor
or similar office holder in the new restructuring plan procedure. Interestingly,
a relatively detailed response to the consultation was submitted by the judges
98 J. Sarra, Rescue! The Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, 2nd ed. (Thomson Reu-
ters Canada Limited 2013), 32.
99 Ibid., 571.
100 Ibid., 571, 574–579.
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of the Chancery Division of the High Court. The Chancery Judges pointed to
the role of the monitor under the Canadian CCAA. But they also expressed
some concern about a move towards US-style valuation fights in cram down
saying, ‘the existing arrangements have the great benefit that in general the
most contentious question (valuation of the business, from which proceeds the
constitution of the classes who are “in the money” and those who are “out of
the money”) depends crucially upon the commercial judgment of the adminis-
trator supporting the pre-pack administration (against whom disgruntled
creditors have a right of recourse) and not upon the judge. Notwithstanding
that the proposal is that the new restructuring plan procedure would adopt the
best alternative available approach, it is suggested here that we may still want
to consider whether a role for the insolvency practitioner as officer of the court
and mediator and facilitator of the restructuring plan should be built into any
new cram down procedure.
Conclusion
Overall, then, I am persuaded of the wisdom of providing for a moratorium at
least in an ‘insolvent’ scheme of arrangement, not because it is widely needed at
the moment, but to assist in more hostile situations and to future proof the
scheme against market changes. I support the decision in the Government
response to make the moratorium optional, but continue to be attracted by the
‘menu approach’ adopted in the European Commission proposal, which en-
ables both the company and the court to flex the scope of themoratorium to deal
with the particular issues of the case. I also support the ability to ‘switch off’
termination events, although suspect that the devil will be in the detail of this
development. To this end, the extensive jurisprudence inUS chapter 11, and the
experience of theCandianCCAAmaycontinue toprovidehelpful guidance.
On balance, I am in favour of valuing the company on the basis of the best
available option in a cross-class cram down procedure, but I accept that
different ‘fairness’ considerations may arise if future cycles do not involve the
compromise of claims amongst highly sophisticated financial creditors, but
also implicate trade. To this end, the UK Government response confirms that
the court will retain an absolute discretion whether or not to confirm a
restructuring plan on just and equitable grounds.
Finally, I am of the view that there would be benefit in building incentives to
bargain into the process and in assisting the court in determining whether the
commercial aspects of whatever test is settled upon have been met. To this end,
and notwithstanding the UK Government response, I think there is a role for
developing the insolvency practitioner as an officer of the court during a
restructuring plan process, to facilitate negotiation and to report to the court.
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